Casus Belli

Hezbollah might have thought it was helping Hamas when it also kidnapped Israeli soldiers and started rocket attacks on northern Israel.

Hezbollah’s paymasters may have cause to rue that mistake.

In the context of an on-going war with Iranian proxies in Lebanon, if Tehran’s mullahs threaten mass anihilation one too many times the Israelis could strike several Iranian nuclear facilities. This would not be a “pre-emptive strike” but a “deep strike” on Hezbollah’s deep pockets ally and supplier.

The diplomatic component of this scenario: the Israelis make the case that in the post-Saddam, post-Beirut Spring Middle East, proxy wars are no longer tolerated. The Iranians will not be able to respond to Israeli strikes in kind. They will be exposed as weak hotheads and they will have lost at least part of their nuclear investment.

Much nonsense has been written about “lessons from Vietnam”. That does not mean there are no valid lessons to be had. This one, for example:

No group can successfully wage unconventional warfare without conventional sponsorship, logistics support, and safe haven.

Hezbollah might have given Israel the casus belli needed to act against Iranian military assets. Not just the nuclear ones, but the intelligence organizations as well. That potentially puts Ali Larijani’s visit to Syria in a different light; are the Iranians having “buyers’ remorse”?

If not yet… I predict they will, soon.